

*ER file*

16 APR 1959

**PERSONAL -- SECRET**

Dear Arleigh:

Thank you for your letter of 28 March 1959, on the subject of Iraq, enclosing a copy of a letter of the same date which you had sent to Chris Carter.

I think we are all in agreement that the situation in Iraq is indeed a desperate one, and that operational planning should be undertaken immediately against the contingency that Iraq may go completely under to the Communists at any time, with its attendant effects on Iran, Kuwait and the entire Middle East. In our planning, we must explore not only our own assets and those of our allies, but those of other States in the area, such as the UAR, who share a mutual concern at the prospect of a Communist State in the heart of the Middle East.

We have done a certain amount of planning over here, and we are in constant touch with the State Department on the problem. I also understand that Gordon Gray, acting on instructions from the President, has asked that the Defense Department, the State Department and other interested Agencies address themselves urgently and jointly to the Iraq problem. We welcome this development because we are convinced that the full resources and imagination of the Government must be enlisted if we are to save this situation.

Thank you for your assurance of support. We will keep you advised as matters develop.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

NAVY review(s) completed.

*card*  
Admiral Arleigh Burke  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington 25, D. C.

cc: DDCI

Signature Recommended:

25X1



Deputy Director (Plans)

25X1

A/DD/P  (15 April 1959)

25X1



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Distribution:

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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Executive Order

11-3/54

**SECRET**

28 March 1959

PERSONAL -- SECRET

Dear Allen:

This morning I discussed with my staff the urgency of taking action to rectify the rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq before that country comes under complete Communist domination.

That you share my concern is evident from the expressed interest of your representatives in discussion with my people as to ways and means of bringing certain of your assets to bear.

I don't presume to suggest courses of action open to you since you have undoubtedly long since considered, among others, such things as the introduction of clandestine agents into Iraq from the UAR, Turkey, or Iran for subversive measures and the initiation of a propaganda campaign centered on the potential disaffection of the Iraqi tribes. However, as a controlling factor to stop the drift toward Communism, oil seems the most important. Any indication of the possibility of a radical decrease in oil revenues as a result of the recent trend should be effective; for example -- rumors or threats of cutting pipe lines, stoppage of oil flow to the Mediterranean via Syria, increase of oil purchases elsewhere by the West and attendant nonpurchase from Iraq. Conversely, indications of the possibility of increased oil revenues through more favorable agreements and increased sales to the West should have considerable braking effect on the slide toward Communism, and might, in the long run, reverse the present trend.

The Navy stands ready to assist you in every possible way in any operation your imaginative and ingenious people may devise. I believe you share my sense of urgency.

PERSONAL -- SECRET

*With warm personal regards.*

*Sincerely yours -*

*Admiral Bunker*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

28 March 1959

**PERSONAL - SECRET**

Dear Chris:

I have been talking with our good friend, Allen Dulles, in regard to the recent reports emanating from Baghdad about Iraq.

I am concerned, and I know you are, because it looks as if Iraq is sliding behind the Iron Curtain at an increased rate.

I know that State is fully aware of the problem as is CIA. But I would like to offer the services of the Navy if there is anything that you think we could possibly do to help keep Iraq from going Communist.

I recognize that there may have been low level discussions with Nasser's people in regard to his accommodating his future actions more closely to the United States views. Although relying upon Nasser may be taking a big chance because he is not a reliable man, yet it looks as if he has available to him the only assets which can be used quickly enough in Iraq. If this is true, then perhaps it might be possible to initiate negotiations with Nasser immediately. If the initial conversations are satisfactory to us, it might be good to offer him support in specific amounts to assist us.

Enclosed is a note which I have sent to Allen Dulles which contains the alternate suggestions of reduction in oil purchases from Iraq and the possibility of raising the prices, if bribery is more useful than reduction of Nasser's income.

With warmest regards on these very busy days of yours.

Sincerely,


**ARLEIGH BURKE**

Honorable Christian A. Hester  
Under Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D.C.

**SECRET**


MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

Attached is a proposed answer to Arleigh  
Burke's letter of 28 March on Iraq (Tab A).



15 April 1959  
(DATE)

STAT



6 April 1959

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Deputy Director (Plans)****SUBJECT : Letter to the Director from Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, dated 28 March 1959**

Herewith is a letter from Admiral Burke to the Director for your information. I received this before it had gone through the machinery of the Director's Office, and I believe we should take the initiative to draft an acknowledgment for the Director's signature. The incoming (or a copy thereof) might then be passed to  for his consideration. I suggest that the line to be taken in the reply could be that we are vigorously exploring with the Department of State types of action designed to stem the line of Communism in Iraq. It may be that we will want to use this letter to elicit Navy help (which includes the Marines) in some paramilitary planning for this area. It is not to be forgotten that the Navy would probably have primary responsibility for any Military task force in the Persian Gulf.

25X1

*(Signature)*  
**RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.**  
Deputy Director  
(Plans)

**Attachment:****Subject Letter w/Att.****(DD/P )**

25X1

✓ **cc: C/NE Division, DD/P**

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

109980 APR 11 1959

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

DCI

NO.

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

17 APR 1959

C/NEA

17 APR 1959

w/all. DD/P-4-5114

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